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Hilsman: American Foreign Policy: Focus on Asia

american foreign policy
focus on asia
asla
ROGER

hilsman

let

me with broad brush strokes try to describe american
II to the present then talk
foreign policy from world war 11
about the cold war relations with the soviet union very
briefly about the middle east more about communist china
even more perhaps about what 1I would call the emerging
nationalism that is the underdeveloped countries of asia
africa the middle east and latin america finally 1I will
end up with vietnam because how we get out of vietnam
how we leave what has turned out to be a quagmire will
set the tone of international politics for decades to come
perhaps for the rest of this century
at the end of world war 11II the united states somewhat
to its surprise found itself faced with a cold war with the
soviet union we were faced with a monolithic communist
world in which moscow called the tune we were faced
with an essentially aggressive communist world in which they
were probing testing our defenses and the will and determination of the noncommunist
non
communist world basically I1 think the
united states handled its relations with the soviet union
rather well we understood the requirements of deterrence
even those who were critical of american foreign policy
such as george kennan were critical of our having over
reacted rather than not reacting at all perhaps we did over
react at times to the so called communist threat and perhaps
we were a little slow to realize when the threat diminished
perhaps we kept up our fighting stance a little longer than
was nec
essary but on the whole I1 think we handled it
necessary
rather well 1I think the marshall plan the rebuilding of
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europe will go down in history as a farsighted generous
act of policy really the first time in the world s history
itself to
nation MV
has taxed
not WHY
devastated
LLIUL a 11ulivii
LU build
that
only our
LUXCLI nacil
DMILL HUL
luu
lou
oui l1tvztblzllcu
oul
allies countries but also our ex enemies 1I think we can be
proud of that
in terms of dealing with the underdeveloped world we
started off very good indeed we recognized that colonialism
was dead and we were on the right side of history in that
we favored independence movements for india for indonesia
for our own ex
excolony
colony the philippines and so on it may
come as a surprise to some people to learn that at the end
of world war 11
II we were supporting ho chi minh the
leader of the communist north our OSS agents 1 I was
in OSS at the time were with ho chi minh our support
was for him because he was the leader of the nationalist
or independence movement in vietnam president roosevelt
was convinced that independence and the end of colonialism
was the future
now our support for independence movements was somewhat tarnished by the cold war 1I don t think we had much
choice As the soviet union probed out and pushed we
found ourselves in a cold war we found ourselves faced
with a more or less monolithic communist world and therefore we had to compromise or adjust our support for the
independence movements 1I would not necessarily say it was
bad 1I would say it was tarnished
I1 think the great failure in foreign policy in the postwar
years was our china policy we became doctrinaire rigid
handie our relations
idealogical and dogmatic we did nothandle
not handle
with communist china in essentially the wise way that
we did with the soviet union with the soviet union we
put up a posture of deterrence to their probes but at the
same time continued to negotiate with them with china
we simply put up a posture of deterrence and attempted to
isolate china 1I think this was a mistake
so where are we now we are in an entirely different
period the cold war is undergoing a transformation indeed
the soviet union is undergoing a transformation in the
first place we are no longer faced with a communist monolith the truth of the matter is that world communism is
sino soviet dispute is a fundamental fact
in disarray the sine
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of this disarray this is as important an international political
fact as anything that has happened in our day the truth of
the matter is that even if china and the soviet union someday restore friendly relations it will never be the same never
again will moscow be able to dictate to peking if friendly
agala
relations are restored it will be more similar to the relations
between washington and london or washington and paris
even in the eastern european communist nations the soviet
union no longer can dictate in the way it once did 1I say
this in spite of czechoslovakia the soviet union panicked
when it thought that czechoslovakia was going so far as
to become anticommunist
anti
pro western in
communist anti soviet and prowestern
poland and rumania there is an independence from moscow
that did not exist a few years ago they will continue to be
loyal allies of the soviet union do not misunderstand me
1I only mean that they are not quite the puppets they once
were we are dealing with an entirely different situation
1I think the implications of this situation are that whereas
we once had a policy toward the communist world we now
must have a policy toward moscow toward warsaw another
toward prague another toward hanoi another toward peking and another toward north korea
now let me repeat that this is not the end of the cold
war 1I do not wish to suggest that the leopard has changed
its spots the communist world is still ambitious the communist world is still atheistic if you will we are not becoming like each other in spite of changes inside the soviet
union the rivalry will continue but it is a different situation because the communist world is no longer a monolith
also moscow has had some bitter experiences in the world
first of all it has had some bitter experiences with the
underdeveloped countries they have poured a billion dollars
into indonesia seeking a war at the time of the west new
guinea crisis in 1962 and they failed it was a wasted effort
they poured a lot of money into guinea who eventually
kicked the soviets out the same thing happened with ghana
so they have had a bitter experience in thinking they could
make puppets of the underdeveloped world
the soviets have had other experiences which have fundamentally altered the soviet way of looking at the outside
world 1I m referring for example to the cuban missile
crisis in 1962 it was my privilege to be a participant in those
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artmont of state
events as director of intelligence of the de
p artment
department
1I sat around that table what happened was that the soviets
and we both looked down a gun barrel of nuclear war and
both of us shrank back from the holocaust that we saw at
the other end
for the soviets we can put it in very crude and simple
terms communism has claimed that the end justifies the
means in those stark dramatic days of the cuban missile
crisis the world s first nuclear crisis the soviets came to believe that there was one means that no end could ever justify
and that means would be nuclear war that would be the
end of all ends to have a nuclear war and 1I think they came
to understand that
now this does not mean that they are no longer comts but what it does mean is that they are now sober
munists
communists so 1I would say that we must make these distinctions about the cold war that it has changed its nature that
we are not faced with a monolithic communism and that the
communist world is a sober world
let me say something now about the middle east we
are caught where we have to try to remain friends with both
the arabs and the israelis the soviets are playing games
in the middle east 1I think dangerous games but here again
it is absolutely essential that we do not face a new threat
by assuming it is like the last threat this is not the soviet
union spreading communism the egyptians nasser and
his successor sadat are not communists there is no effective
egyptian communist party they re anti communists all
the egyptian communists are in jail or exiled but russia
has been giving egypt and the arab countries massive amounts
of military aid and there are fifteen thousand russian advisers manning some of those surface to air missile sites in
egypt but it is a game that has almost nothing to do with
communism as an ide
ideology
idealogy
alogy or a doctrine this is a game that
azars
russia could have played under the czars
since 1I m going to have some fairly harsh things to say
about the nixon administration s vietnam policy 1I think
here 1I will say the nixon administration has had a very wise
intelligent sophisticated middle east policy by and large
the progress that has been made in the middle east toward
negotiation and the credit can be given to the nixon administration their bringing about negotiations between the
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israelis and the arabs has been a very good thing 1I do not
see that anything else can be done by the united states in
the middle east except what we are doing that is reluctantly
to support israel when the arms balance gets out of balance
when the arabs get too far ahead and at the same time urgently talk to the soviets pointing out the risk they are
taking patiently trying to play upon the differences within
the soviet government
now let us turn to east asia 1I will speak more about
asia not just because 1I was assistant secretary of state for
far eastern affairs 1I am not a far east specialist 1I am a
generalist I1 succeeded averell harriman and he s not a
far eastern expert either but 1I would like to talk about the
far east because 1I think it is vitally important and 1I m
thinking now of china
let me set the scene by saying that 1I wish to avoid two
traps one is the trap that dean rusk fell into I1 believe
shortly before the end of the johnson administration he
made a speech in which he talked about a billion chinese in
a few decades armed with nuclear weapons the press quickly
labeled this speech rather unfairly the yellow peril speech
1I think it was rather unfair because rusk gave the image of
a chinese nation so aggressive as to be eager to invade and
occupy its neighbors 1I do not think this is correct this is a
trap that 1I wish to avoid but on the other hand 1I do not
want to fall into the trap of having you believe that they are
a bunch of nice guys the truth lies somewhere in the middle
between these two positions
now against that background let us take a quick look
at china first of all this is a nation of approximately
hard working self
750 million people they are ambitious hardworking
disciplined scientific artistic as capable as any other people
they occupy a country of continental size within whose borders are all the resources for making china a great power
equal to any in the world they have had a peculiar history
their relationship to their neighbors has been either that of
master to vassal or as the sick man of asia over whose
prostrate body other nations those of the west and even
japan trampled almost at will
the chinese are now coming out of the trauma of the
so called cultural revolution first of all it is not a revolt
by the mass of the chinese peasants against their communist
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tyrants the masses are not revolting it has nothing to do
with chiang kai shek and the nationalists on taiwan chiang
is forgotten 1I have to say in honesty that the mass of the
chinese people do not know who chiang is and don t care
never
riever going to come back to the mainland in my judghe s niever
ment
the cultural revolution is one of the few revolutions in
the world s history that has come from above
it really
stems from mao tse tung s concept of permanent revolution
which includes a constant churning of society so as to prevent
the emergence of a new ruling elite in a practical political
sense the cultural revolution is a struggle between several
different factions of the communist party of china
1I would say that the important thing for americans to
remember or to understand about the cultural revolution is
Elsen hower s secretary of state
that john foster dulles eisen
eisenhower
was fundamentally wrong when he said that communism
was a passing phase in china the victors of the cultural
revolution will be one or another faction of the communist
party the communist party will continue to rule china
now again if 1I had been speaking in the 1950s or the 1940s
to say that china would be ruled by one or another faction of
the communist party would be to say something rather important and significant to say that today is to say nothing
which communist party which kind of communism
breshnew
Bresh nev s and kosygin
stalin s or tito s or breshnev
dubcek s
kosigin s or dubcak
somewhat prowestern
pro western anti soviet kind of communism or mao
tse tung s kind of communism or some other kind they
are all as different as day and night it goes back to what 1I
meant when I1 said in the beginning that we could no longer
have a policy toward communism
so to say that china will be ruled by one or another
faction of the communist party is to say nothing of any
importance you can say something about who will succeed
mao but what you say about them largely is that they are
chinese rather than communists they will be ambitious
very ambitious indeed they will be ambitious to restore
china to its former place of dominance in asia they will
be ambitious to give china a voice in world affairs commensurate with the size of its population the size of its territory
indeed its stature as a nation
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you could also say that the communist party that survives
and takes over after mao will be hostile to the outside world
it will be hostile not just to the united states and the west
it will be hostile to its fellow communist power the soviet
union partly this is chinese partly it is the history of the
communist party of china their long march and their long
sojourn in the caves of yenan
benan but they will be hostile to
the outside world whether it is a communist outside world
or noncommunist
non
communist outside world they will be hostile
but at the same time the chinese will be extraordinarily
cautious extraordinarily realistic in their assessment of what
they can do and what they can get away with let me illustrate this point by a little anecdote in 1962 at the time of the
chinese indian war when they fought a very sharp but
very short war president kennedy sent a team of five people
to new delhi to find out what was happening and what
the united states should do this was headed by averell
harriman and included myself when we got to new delhi
it was thanksgiving day of 1962 A week or ten days before that the chinese armies up in the northeast frontier
of india had defeated the indian army when we landed in
new delhi there was not a single battalion of the indian
army standing between us and the mass chinese armies in
the northeast frontier yet the chinese stopped short of the
line to which they had some vague historical claim and
unilaterally and voluntarily withdrew twelve and one half
miles now why did they do this it gasn
wasn t because the
indian army was effective 1I think they did it partly out of
respect for indian nationalism understanding that if they did
invade and try to occupy india they would be faced with the
kind of guerrilla warfare we have seen to our sorrow in
vietnam asian nationalism would fight against a foreign
invader
1I think second of all they feared a soviet reaction if
they invaded the soviets had been encouraging chinese
neutralism and the chinese attack on india was a slap in
the soviets face as well as a humiliation for india
finally 1I think they feared our possible reaction
what 1I m trying to say is that the chinese are going to
be extraordinarily cautious it seems to me that our policy
of attempting to isolate communist china should be changed
many non chinese people in asia think we are the cause of
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chinese aggressiveness because of this policy that we ought
to have the same policy toward china as we have toward
the soviet union we should trade with them in anything
but military hardware instead we have a policy that we
will not trade even nylon stockings not only that we try
to twist the arms of our allies to try to prevent them from
trading in peaceful nonmilitary goods it is a silly policy
it seems to me that it will be a long hard road it will be
decades before we reach the stage with china that we have
reached with the soviet union but as the chinese say a
journey of a thousand nailer
miles starts with a single step that
step is overdue
once again let me pay mr nixon something of a compliment in that he has lifted travel restrictions a step which
1I think is in the right direction
but mr nixon ought to
move much more rapidly in this direction more rapidly to
bring china into the united nations
now 1I have emerging nationalism and vietnam to deal
with in fifteen minutes which is a formidable task by
emerging nationalism 1I am thinking of the underdeveloped
countries not only of asia but of africa the middle east
and latin america I1 think what you re going to see here is
a new and virile form of nationalism you got a taste of it
by watching egypt under nasser indonesia under sukarno
ghanaunder
ghana under nkrumah cambodia under Shian
onk all these
shianonk
leaders are gone now but the nationalism continues and I1
think you are going to see more of it in more countries
1I think nations like the philippines are going to be taking
positions that the unsophisticated will think are anti american
or antiforeign actually 1I think it will be pro filipino it will
be more nationalistic than anything else
let me say that it is hard to understand these virulent
nationalisms for example they use the verbiage of marx
they sound like communists but they are not communists
they use a lot of the verbiage of socialism but in fact they
are nationalists
predictions in international politics are difficult my crystal ball is no less cloudy than anyone else s but if 1I had to
make a predication about the wave of the future it would
be that it is not communism in these underdeveloped countries
of the world nor is it some pax americana it is this new
nationalism where they will borrow and choose from social
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iams and put
ism from capitalism and from all
ail
ali the other isms
a large dose of their own traditions in it for their course
1I would ilke
like to mention briefly at least gour
four things about
the asian countries which we ought to understand first 1I
would like to give you the vision that 1I see of what is happening out there for two of three thousand years these people
of asia africa the middle east and even latin america
have been psychologically economically and politically turned
inward in essentially a village culture 1I was a guerrilla
wax 11
II in southeast asia and 1I can remember
leader in world war
operating in laos china burma and thailand but you
never knew which country you were in because the borders
are so confused if you would stop a man on the jungle
trail and say who are you
meaning are you burmese
chinese or thai he would say 1 I am of the village of ben
sue
suc or something similar if you kept pushing him he
might say he was of a certain dialect or a certain region
and finally say oh 1I know what you mean 1I m burmese

but it would take about fifteen minutes for him to get around
to that

this

village culture is changing very rapidly now and
you must have an image of these teeming millions of asia
africa and middle east awakening searching for a higher
identification reaching out to a newer broader identity the
identity of nationalism the one motive of nationalism is
most of them have either experienced coloanti
anticolonialism
colonialism
nialism or the form of it that china and thailand got sort
of a gunboat colonialism even though a colonial regime did
not actually take over it was humiliating in the deepest
psychological sense 1I could give you examples but in the
interest of time let me say that they know that colonialism
is dead they now talk in terms of neocolonialism
neocolonialisin
and they
neo
colonialism
fear it they fear that somehow indirect controls will be re
imposed to replace the direct controls of colonialism
A second characteristic 1I think is that these people are
in what 1I would call an identity crisis who are they what
many people
does it mean to be vietnamese or filipino
tend to think that vietnam is only in a struggle between
communists and anti communists actually it is a struggle
between several different factions who are attempting to
seize the power to be the ones to define what it is to be
vietnamese and it is difficult there are psychological
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problems take the philippines a nation of thirty five million people ethnically homogenous most of them are of
the malayan race because of the occupation of the spanish
for three hundred years they are religiously homogenous
roman catholic yet within that archipelago are spoken
some eighty seven mutually unintelligible languages and dialects they must conduct their national business in their
congress in english the language of the colonial power
which is already a psychological humiliation even the name
of the country for a people searching for a new nationalism
is somewhat humiliating instead of harking back to some
ancient england or france or something like that the name
is the philippines pawns of king philip of spain
A third characteristic is a fierce desire to modernize that
does not mean a higher standard of living which they
would reject on the grounds of materialism they do not
want a TV set in every bedroom and two cars in every garage
they want steel mills jet aircraft transportation systems all
the things that make a nation strong and powerful mao
tse tung does not speak for these people but he said something about his own country china that 1I think strikes a
responsive chord in their hearts he said china has stood up
with the image of a giant struggling to its feet from the
gutter to look other nations including the soviet union as
well as the united states level in the eye that is what
these people want to do
finally they are fiercely determined to be masters of their
own fate they are fiercely determined to make the decisions
about their future about what happens in their region and
to have a voice in world affairs to have a hand on the steering wheel of this planet 1I think this is going to happen 1I
think this is the way to the future 1I do not think we even
ought to try to make sure that it is done on an american
model it certainly will not be done on the communist model
it will be done on some model that is peculiarly their own
and in that case 1I think that it should be done with our
sympathy and understanding rather than over our dead bodies
now let me say in my judgment that almost everything
that is going to happen in international politics in asia
africa and the middle east for as long as anyone in this
room is still on this planet will revolve around these nationalisms the implications are profound and pervasive
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As
1
and
ljean RUSK
rusk
jonnson turned
johnson
as an illustration
anci lyndon
turnea
i jean
inusuarion dean
kusk ancl
vietnam into an american war made it an american war
by bombing north vietnam and sending american troops
because they felt that it was a domino that is that all these
countries of southeast asia were vulnerable to native guerrilla
communist movements of course they are all vulnerable
to an invasion by china but that is not what was meant by
dominges
dominoes they meant that they were vulnerable to an internal domestic native guerrilla communist movement in
the 1940s and the early 1950s they were new governments
newly emerging from colonialism weak in experience but
believe me they are no longer this was unfortunately a lag
dominoes
dom
inoes now we may create dominges
dominoes
they ceased to be dominges
by our invasions of places like cambodia but there are no
dominges
dominoes in southeast asia if left to themselves indonesia
for instance had the largest communist party of any country
outside the communist world in 1965 two million members
the communists were so ill advised as to attempt a coup
betat the moslem peasants and the soldiers in the army
d etat
d6tat
detat
rose up and killed according to official CIA sources over
300000 members of the communist party within a matter
of a few weeks the australians that 1I ve talked to who
were there at the time say that it is really a much higher
figure they estimate nearly a million the point is that it
took no american soldiers to do this and the reason was that
the indonesian peasant had identified communism with a
foreign power ie with china and it was the foreigners
they were fighting against
we have discussed the emerging nationalisms and 1I
think this is the key to vietnam many of us thought that
vietnam was a simple communist aggression certainly
lyndon johnson did and dean rusk did well it was a
communist aggression the north armed guerrillas and trained
them they were directed by hanoi but it was considerably
more than simple communist aggression it was in fact an
anti colonial movement feeding on social discontent the need
anticolonial
for land reform feeding on frustrated nationalism whose
leaders by an accident of history were communists the
accident of history is that the french in what was probably
the most monumental stupidity in post world war 11
II times
attempted to reimpose colonialism when any high school
kid knew that colonialism was dead As a consequence the
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peasants of vietnam looked around for an independent party
a political party that would fight the french and it happened
that the only party around was the communist we are seeing here what 1I think is a unique phenomena that is the
last asian nation in which communism captured the leadership of nationalism
against this background if we are not fighting communism in vietnam but rather nationalism then it is understandable
stan dable why military force is not really effective we have
bombed north and south vietnam since 1965 and we have
dumped more bombs on north and south vietnam than
were dumped on both japan and germany throughout world
war 11
II it hurt the north vietnamese a great deal but it
was not decisive it did not end the war we also sent in
500000 american troops to supplement approximately a
million south vietnamese troops the military side in a very
narrow military sense has been a great success the american
soldiers there have performed superbly and bravely they have
been well led by their officers the logistics have probably been
the most magnificent and efficient in the history of the world
in narrow military terms it has been a victory for every
american or south vietnamese killed there have been somewhere between five and ten north vietnamese viet cong
killed
all this however happens to be irrelevant the authority
1I like to quote at this point is one of our greatest soldier
statesmen general matthew ridgeway who opposed the
american intervention in 1964 in vietnam and has opposed
it ever since he quite correctly said that it would not work
that we were using military force for a goal to which military
force was not suited that of changing people s minds of
destroying communism as a political force in south vietnam
and as general ridgeway said you can destroy people you
can kill all the vietnamese in the world but you cannot
change their minds with military force to do that you would
have to kill every eighteen year old class for eighteen years
it just would not work for this particular goal
if you want a vivid illustration ask yourself this we
have had some troubles in this country the riots in watts
the riots of chicago the notorious riot at columbia university a few years ago what if the president of the united
states went to the prime minister of germany or the prime
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minister of japan and said send 500000 german troops or
japanese troops over here to put down the riots in our cities
1I would suspect that hawks doves democrats republicans
blacks whites every faction of society would take to the streets
to fight the foreigner when a vietnamese peasant looks
at black and white american faces and also sees his village
bombed or shelled what does he think these people get
hurt in wars generally speaking what he seems to think is
that the communist side must be right the americans must
be trying to reimpose colonialism so for every viet cong
you kill you recruit two or three for the viet cong the
CIA tells me as of last week that the political organization
infra structure of the communists is intact in
the political infrastructure
the villages of south vietnam we have broken up the main
force units but the political structure is intact this means
that the structure for recruiting organizing and training
is there
against this background mr nixon s policy of vietnam
ization is a vast improvement over lyndon johnson s policy
of escalation but it does not go far enough it is not a decision to end the war it is a decision to continue the war
with vietnamese ground forces and american air forces
this means that the time will be stretched out in which
something can go wrong that might bring communist china
in it means that five hundred or so americans who are
prisoners in north vietnam will spend the rest of their lives
in a communist prison camp they will never be released so
long as there are american troops in south vietnam the
only way to get them out is through a negotiated settlement
1I think it commits us and puts the great united states in
the pocket of two comic opera generals thieu and ky
the great united states becomes the puppet of two people
who do not even have the support of their own people who
are supported by no more than about ten percent landlords
and catholics but not the buddhists nor the bulk of the
population
such a policy neglects the true american interest which
is not whether south vietnam is governed by a communist
government or by a coalition government that includes the
communists we have certainly tolerated a country of similar
size ninety miles from our coast and it chasn
hasn t noticeably
hurt the united states I1 m thinking of cuba what does
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affect the american interest is the whole of southeast asia
american interests would be served by a neutralized stabilized southeast asia it happens that we can get this the
communist side in paris is offering this for cold blooded
realistic reasons because of the sino soviet dispute north
vietnam and the soviet union are frightened of a southeast asia dominated by communist china it happens that
cold bloodedly hardheadedly realistically not through any
sentiment the soviets and hanoi would like to see a negotiated neutralized southeast asia we can t hope to make
anti
anticommunism
southeast asia a bastion of anticommunist
communism it would cost
millions of american lives because we would have to fight
the chinese what we can hope for is a neutralized southeast asia it is in our interest that southeast asia not be
dominated by communist china there are here the elements
of a deal the north vietnamese have told averell harriman
end they want to make a deal
frightend
frightens
at paris that they are fright
they want to exchange ambassadors with the western countries
they say look we fought the french not just for ten years
we fought them for ninety years but now we have friendly
relations with the french we are not doing this out of
sentimental reasons but because we need somebody to balance the chinese we would like to have friendly relations
with the united states
let me say in the end that 1I think that mr nixon is
making a mistake in not permitting our ambassador to negotiate this deal that is being offered 1I think that not because 1I trust the communists 1I don t trust them for a moment but you can trust their self interests you can trust
the political pressures working on them even if you cannot
trust them so 1I say that nixon has not gone far enough
because he is refusing turning his back on a settlement that
would be in the american interest
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